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Stakeholder influence and optimal regulations:  




During the last decades non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially those 
concerned with environmental matters (henceforth ENGOs), have taken an 
increased interest in fisheries activities. This is the case also in EU fisheries, 
where overfishing has been a permanent problem the last decades, causing poor 
economic and environmental performance (COM 2009). The ENGOs interact 
with the fisheries’ management by trying to influence the preferences, and thus 
decisions of the authorities and fishers, such that environmental concerns obtain a 
greater weight at the expense of other concerns. In the EU, they primarily do this 
by approaching the EU Commission or national authorities. When these bodies 
are insensitive to the ENGOs’ efforts, the ENGOs may exert effort more directly 
upon the fishers. Examples of this are calls for boycotting fish products not 
harvested sustainably, dumping rocks to mark marine protected areas, and issuing 
certificates for fisheries with sustainably harvested stocks.  
Applying a common agency model in combination with a steady-state 
bioeconomic model, this paper analyses the consequences of giving an ENGO a 
say in the regulation of fishers’ activity. With symmetric information and identical 
fishers we show that introducing an additional principal with strong conservation 
interests implies that the original principal (the authorities) puts forward a weaker 
regulation than in a single principal situation. The aggregate of the authorities’ 
and the ENGO’s regulation, which is the regulation the fishers face, is however 
stricter compared to the regulation under one principal. The optimal regulation 
depends on fishers’ costs, and letting harvesting costs be private information, 
when information revelation is an optimal strategy the authorities will regulate a 
high cost fisher stricter than a low cost fisher. Giving an ENGO a say in the 
fisheries management will change the authorities’ optimal regulation of each type 
of fisher, and the difference between the high and low cost fisher regulations is 
reduced. The reason is that introducing a new stakeholder with stronger 
environmental interests will make the aggregate of the regulations stricter. Thus, 
effort and harvest is lower, and the need for distorting the high cost fishers’ effort 
downward is lower.  
Single principal-agent (PA) models, where one principal regulates one agent, have 
previously been applied to analyse fisheries regulations. Addressing the problem 
of overfishing, JENSEN AND VESTERGAARD [2002a] propose that EU authorities 
can collect a resource tax from the member states based on their fishing activity, 
and the member states can in turn collect the tax from the fishers. This is 
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suggested as an alternative to the present Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 
limitations, which have proven ineffective in preventing overfishing because the 
presence and extent of illegal landings and discards is information private to the 
fishers, making it difficult for the regulators to assess the stock level and set 
quotas. They use a PA-model to derive the optimal regulation (tax) in the presence 
of private information about harvest costs and show that whereas the low cost 
fishers are regulated as under symmetric information, the high cost fishers are 
regulated more strictly and their effort and thus harvest is distorted downward. 
Due to the resource restriction (equilibrium harvest) in equilibrium the low cost 
fishers may apply more effort and can obtain larger harvests than under symmetric 
information. This effect is new compared to the standard principal-agent theory, 
and is explicitly derived in JENSEN AND VESTERGAARD [2002b]. JENSEN AND 
VESTERGAARD [2007] also develop a tax scheme consisting of a stock tax and a 
tax on self-reported catches, which can solve several problems connected to 
overfishing and uncertain stock levels. Other papers concerning the optimal 
regulation of fishing activities when the fishers have private information about 
harvest, discards and landings are JENSEN AND VESTERGAARD [2002c] who derive 
a tax scheme where the tax rate is based on the state of the stock biomass instead 
of reported landings, and HANSEN, JENSEN, BRANDT AND VESTERGAARD [2006] 
who derive a tax scheme which is based on the authorities’ knowledge about the 
aggregate of the cost functions, but not the individual costs and the actual 
landings. 
Whereas the above papers’ main concern are to derive optimal regulation schemes 
for fishing activities when the fishers have private information, this paper’s focus 
is on the effects on the optimal regulation of introducing a second regulator and 
how a second regulator affects the optimal regulation when fishers have private 
information about harvesting costs. Although we apply the same type of model as 
in the above mentioned papers, there are some crucial differences. The above 
papers assume heterogeneous fishers, which imply that the optimal regulation 
(tax) varies between individual fishers. Further, the optimal tax is non-linear in 
effort. In practise such schemes are difficult to implement, as is also recognised 
by JENSEN AND VESTERGAARD [2002a, p.281] stating that “The realism of this tax 
structure may be questioned. When applied in practice, the tax structure can be 
approximated with a uniform tax schedule within groups of fishing vessels. 
Furthermore, a two-part linear tax can be a proxy for the non-linear tax.” We 
follow these suggestions and apply the so-called Walsh-contract. WALSH [1995] 
showed that a government’s optimal contract regulating the central bank’s 
monetary policy, is linear in money growth, and thus in the inflation rate.  
The first to apply Walsh contracts in a common agency setting were DIXIT AND 
JENSEN [2003], analysing how member countries in a monetary union try to 
induce the common central bank (CCB) to follow their preferred economic policy. 
Later, CHORTAREAS AND MILLER [2004] extend the original model of WALSH 
[1995] taking into consideration the influence of a second principal, e.g. an 
organisation representing the industries who may be interested in boosting output, 
and who is in the position of affecting the CCB’s behaviour. They develop 
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optimal non co-operative contracts for the two principals when their interests 
coincide, and when they do not, and show that these are linear in money growth 
and inflation. CAMPOY AND NEGRETE [2008] is a comment to CHORTAREAS AND 
MILLER [2004] and shows that there is only one coherent way to solve the type of 
common agency treated in the latter, namely that the participation constraint of 
the agent is taken explicitly into consideration. This is not done in CHORTAREAS 
AND MILLER [2004] and the two approaches give different results. As there seems 
to be no disagreement that the principal’s optimisation problem must be 
conditioned on the agent’s participation constraint, we follow CAMPOY AND 
NEGRETE [2008], and translated to the fisheries sector this implies that we assume 
a regulation mechanism which is linear in effort and with a general component 
(lump sum transfer) which secures participation on behalf of the fishers. One of 
the most recent contributions to the common agency literature where linear 
(Walsh) contracts are used, is CICCARONE AND MARCHETTI [2012]. They use the 
model from CAMPOY AND NEGRETE [2008], but extend it by introducing 
uncertainty regarding the preference structure of the agent, i.e. the weights 
attached to the interests represented in the agent’s objective function whereas 
CAMPOY AND NEGRETE [2008] only assume uncertainty regarding the actual value 
of the interests (output and inflation). The way we treat uncertainty in this paper 
follows that of CAMPOY AND NEGRETE [2008], introducing uncertainty regarding 
the fishers’ harvesting costs.  
To our knowledge the effects on the optimal regulation of including a new 
stakeholder in the fisheries management has not been treated analytically. We do 
this in section 2. As long as information is symmetric, optimal regulation by two 
principals can be treated as an optimisation problem with strategic interaction 
between the two regulators, and thus solved by the use of a Cournot game. 
Introducing asymmetric information between the regulators and the fishers, 
derivation of the optimal regulations becomes a common agency problem. In 
section 3 we solve this problem analytically and derive the optimal information 
revealing regulations of the two principals. Section 4 concludes the paper.      
 
2 Optimal fisheries regulations with two regulators and symmetric 
information  
Main objectives of fisheries’ management around the world is expressed as a 
combination of environmental and social, including economic, interests, where the 
relative weights of these interests have changed over time [COM 2009, NOAA 
2007]. The implementation of fisheries management objectives is in the case of 
EU-fisheries delegated to national authorities and in the US there is also a division 
of work between federal and state authorities when it comes to fisheries 
regulations [BURKE 1982]. For the analysis in this paper we assume that the utility 
of the regulating authorities and the new stakeholder, here represented by an 
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denote the utility, U, from fishing activities to fisheries’ regulators, expressed as a 
function of the environmental (ENV) and the social (SOC) interests, and weighted 






It is realistic to assume that the environmental interest (ENV) represents a 
conservationist viewpoint, which establishes that utility increases with fish stock 
size up to the maximum sustainable yield level, X
MSY
, i.e. conservationists want to 
maximise growth of the stock. As a proxy for the environmental interest we use 
the long run equilibrium harvest function )E,X(h , where X is the stock level of 
the species and E is effort applied by an individual fisher in the harvest, and 
harvest equals stock growth. The national authorities maximise the long run 
production function aggregated over all (national) fishers, and thus we multiply by 
K, the number of (homogenous) fishers in a representative member state. When 
0),(',  EXhXX E
MSY , whereas when 0),(',  EXhXX E
MSY . Hence, if 
the stock is lower than X
MSY
, an increase in effort gives an even lower stock, that 
in turn gives a lower equilibrium harvest. For most EU-fisheries it is a fact that 
MSYXX  , which implies that  0)E,X('h E  .  
The social, including economic interest (SOC) is given by the economic rent 
aggregated over all fishers,  KaE)E,X(pg 2 , where p is the market price for 
the species harvested, )E,X(g  is the short run production (harvest) function. a is 
a cost parameter, and the costs, given by 2aE , imply increasing marginal costs, 
stating that the higher the effort already is, the more it costs to increase it further 
[ANDERSEN 1979]. The reason is that for given capacity, the costs will increase as 
we approach the capacity limit because then the gear is utilised more intensely. 
For the short run harvest function we assume 0)E,X('g,0)E,X('g XE   . 
Note that the objective function given in (1), and as explained above, implies a 
combination of long and short run considerations.
2
 Given the composite interests 
authorities and other stakeholders may have regarding the fisheries, it is not 
obvious that the maximum sustainable or maximum economic yield is the optimal 
harvest of a specific stock or fishery. Our point of departure is that the authorities 
and other stakeholders given a say in the fisheries regulation determine the 
regulation in order to maximise their objective function. We assume an input 
regulation, which can be expressed in economic terms, e.g. a tax on effort.
3
 
Concentrating on an input regulation in the form of a tax makes the model flexible 
                                                 
2
 One may object to this formulation of the objective function arguing that whereas the first term is 
measured in kg the last term is measured in money. It is a trivial matter to measure the first term in 
monetary units by multiplying with a unit price.  
3
 Specifying a relationship between effort and harvest, e.g. by a Schaefer production function, this 
input regulation can easily be transformed to an output regulation, i.e. a tax or subsidy on harvest.  
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in the sense that a negative regulation can be interpreted as a subsidy. The 
regulation set by the authorities and which each fisher faces is given by Ett 10  , 
where t1 is a unit regulation, e.g. a tax rate, aiming at affecting the effort applied 
in the fishery, while t0 is a general regulation, e.g. a lump sum transfer from 
fishers to the regulator. The corresponding regulation for the ENGO is given by 
E10   . Each of the parameters may be positive or negative. For tractability of 
the model we start out by assuming homogenous fishers. Hence, a given set of 
regulations either enables all fishers a non-negative rent or drives all fishers out of 
the fishery. As the latter option is of little theoretical interest, we concentrate on 
situations where the participation constraint is fulfilled, i.e. all fishers are allowed 
a non-negative rent. We impose this as an explicit condition on the regulators’ 
optimisation, and the lump sum transfer secures that this constraint can be 
fulfilled. Due to the presence of some (other) regulations the fishers may extract a 
rent initially, and as long as information is symmetric the use of Walsh-contracts 
enables the principal(s) to regulate away any potential rent.  
We formulate the regulation of the fisheries as a static 2-stage non-cooperative 
game between the regulators (authorities, ENGO), and the fishers. In the first 
stage each regulator individually and simultaneously set their regulation and the 
fishers do nothing. In the second stage the fishers decide whether to participate in 
the fishery given the regulations, and if yes they fix the effort, E. If the fishers do 
not accept the regulation they leave the fishery, and in this case the pay-off to both 
fishers and regulators is normalised to zero. We assume the fishers’ response to be 
“immediate”, eliminating time costs. The model is static and we do not take into 
consideration out-of-equilibrium strategies for any of the actors.  
For simplicity we assume that each individual fisher maximises economic rent 
from the fishing activity, and the participation constraint for an individual fisher is 
given by   
(2)   0E)Ett()aE)E,X(pg( 1010
2        
To ensure a biological equilibrium (steady state level for the stock) it must be the 








where F(X) is the natural net growth in the stock, and N is the number of nations 
taking part in the fishery. The last right hand term is then total harvest of the 
specific stock in the relevant sea area, and for simplicity we have assumed that the 
number of fishers (K) is the same in all participating countries/states.   
The regulators’ optimisation problem now is given by (4):  
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(4) kkE MUmax    
s.t. (2) and (3)     
where the superscript k denotes the regulator, k=MS indicates (member) state 
authorities and k=NGO indicates the ENGO.  KEttM 10
MS   is the 
regulation revenue which accrue to the authorities, and  KEM 10
NGO    is 
the regulation revenue which accrue to the ENGO when regulating domestic 
fishers. 1,0   are parameters expressing the share of the total regulation 
revenue which the authorities and the ENGO respectively receive.   
The solution to the optimisation problems, given as optimal effort for the 






































      
where γ, φ are the Lagrange multipliers, indicating the shadow values of the stock 
constraint for the authorities and the ENGO respectively. 
The left hand side of (2) is the rent of an individual fisher when he/she is 
regulated by two regulators, and maximising this with respect to E yields the 










   
Equalising (7) with (5) and (6) and solving for t1 and τ1 yields the optimal 
regulation for each of the two regulators as a reaction to the regulation of the other 
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 For these to be explicit solutions to the optimisation problems we need to assume a harvest 
function which is linear in effort. In other cases, (5) and (6) implicitly yields the optimal effort.  
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These reaction functions demonstrate very clearly the point made by BERNHEIM 
AND WHINSTON [1986] that in constructing optimal regulations in agency 
problems with more than one principal, each principal first takes out the 
incentives of the other principal and then creates its own incentives. Or put in 
their words; “only the net incentive scheme matters, so each principal can take out 
what others put in before designing his preferred scheme.” [op cit, p. 929]. As the 
first part of the first right hand term in (8) and (9) is smaller than one, (8) and (9) 
show that each principal only takes out a part of what the other principal has put 
into the regulation. The higher the socio-economic (henceforth economic) interest 
is, the higher is the part of the regulation set by the other principal which is taken 
out, whereas the higher  ,  are, for constant economic interests, the lower is the 
part that is taken out. This is reasonable as high economic interests imply that they 
prefer a high effort level and thus a low regulation, whereas high  ,  indicates 




Solving for (8) and (9) simultaneously yields explicit expressions for the optimal 
tax rates,
6
 and the aggregate regulation, also called the net incentive scheme, and 




















     
The net incentive scheme unambiguously decreases in the economic interest of 




2 ,  and increases in the environmental 




1 , , in the marginal long run 
harvest, and in the shadow values of the stock externality.  
When the authorities are the sole regulator of the fishery, the optimal regulation is 
given by
7














 .       
PROPOSITION 1 Giving a new stakeholder a say in the fisheries regulation changes 
the optimal regulation of the original regulator.  
PROOF Comparing (8) and (11), shows that the last right hand term of (8) 
coincides with the right hand side of (11). Hence, when the ENGO forwards a tax 
                                                 
5
 Since ,  give the part of the regulation revenue the regulators receive, they also give the part 
of the net transfer to the fishers the regulators must pay if the regulation revenue is negative.   
6
 Explicit expressions for the optimal tax/subsidy rates are given by (A7) and (A8) in appendix AII 
7
 In deriving the optimal regulation for one regulator we have used the model of JENSEN AND 
VESTERGAARD [2002A] and the derivation of (11) is given in the appendix, AI. 
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(τ1>0) the authorities respond by relaxing their regulation, and when the ENGO 
forwards a subsidy the authorities strengthen their regulation. Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION 2  Giving a new stakeholder with stronger environmental and weaker 
economic interests a say in fisheries regulation, increases the regulation pressure 
and the equilibrium stock.  
PROOF The aggregate of the authorities’ and the ENGO’s regulations is higher 
compared to the optimal single principal regulation when  
(12)    NGONGOMSMSNGOENGOMSE hNg 1212122 ''    
  
It is realistic to assume that the ENGO has a higher shadow price on the stock 
than the authorities, i.e.   , and that the ENGO has higher environmental and 








1 ,   . 
Then, if MSYXX  , the right hand side of the inequality is negative, whereas the 
left hand side is positive, and hence (12) is always fulfilled. If MSYXX  , both 
sides of (12) are positive, and then the more equal weights the two regulators have 
the more likely it is that the inequality is fulfilled. For typical functional forms 
)E,X('g)E,X('h EE  , and this supports the inequality in (12).  






















When MSYXX  , the optimal effort per fisher is always lower compared to when 
there is only one principal. In standard bio-economic models with logistic growth 
and Cobb-Douglas production function the equilibrium stock is decreasing in E 
when MSYXX  , and thus the equilibrium stock is higher under two regulators 
compared to with one regulator. Q.E.D. 
As the income from the regulation enters the regulators’ objective functions 
positively, the fishers’ participation constraint will always be fulfilled with 
equality. Hence, in equilibrium 0),,t,t(U 1010
F  , where FU  is the pay-off to 
an individual fisher. In equilibrium the fishers have to accept both regulations, 
because if not, the regulations are not optimal responses to each other. Thus, it 
must be the case that 0),,0,0(U,0)0,0,t,t(U 10
F
10
F   . For these conditions to 




, do not need to satisfy the participation 
constraint of the fishers individually.
8
  
                                                 
8
 The derivation of the equilibrium transfers are given in the appendix, AII. 
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Note that in the case of low effort, caused by a high tax rate, the regulation may 
imply a transfer from the authorities to the fisher, i.e. a negative t0 and/or 0 .  
We have assumed that both regulators behave in a non-cooperative way. 
However, in making their decision, the authorities take into account the interests 
of the ENGO, and it is possible to imagine models where the authorities instead 
cooperate with new stakeholders having an interest in the fisheries. If, for 
instance, the two regulators have identical interests, the same threat point value, 
and receive the same share of the regulation revenue, then applying the Nash 
bargaining solution [NASH 1950], results in the same optimal effort and unit 
regulation as with a sole regulator. In this case the Nash product equals 
  NGOMSkUUNP k  ,20 , where kU is given by (1) and 0U  is an 
exogenous threat point. Maximising NP with respect to E yields the optimal 
cooperative effort. It can be shown that this also coincides with the two-
regulators, non-cooperative equilibrium solution derived above, but only as long 
as the assumption about identical regulators holds. As soon as we allow the 
regulators to differ with respect to the interest weights and regulation revenue 
share, the two approaches will give different solutions.  
 
3 Optimal fisheries’ regulations with two regulators and asymmetric 
information 
Regulating an agent under symmetric information is a straightforward 
optimisation problem. When we assume that the fishers have private information, 
e.g. with respect to the harvesting costs, information revelation becomes an issue. 
Let aL and aH denote the cost parameters for a low cost and a high cost fisher 
respectively. From the symmetric information case it is obvious that a first best 
solution to the fisheries regulation implies type-specific regulations. The problem 
of formulating one regulation for each type of fisher, where the participation 
constraint is binding for both, is that the regulation intended for a high cost fisher 
will also be chosen by a low cost fisher as this would provide him rent, whereas 
the regulation intended for a low cost fisher would give him zero rent. It is well 
known that when formulating regulations under asymmetric information it is 
necessary to impose an incentive compatibility condition on the regulation of a 
low cost fisher, ensuring that it is profitable for the low cost fisher to choose the 
regulation intended for him (information revelation) [FUDENBERG AND TIROLE 
1993]. This, however, presupposes that information revelation (disclosing the type 
of the fisher) is a utility maximising strategy.  
LEMMA  With one regulator, information revelation is a utility maximising 
strategy only if the realisation of the regulator’s economic interests regarding the 
fisheries on the margin exceeds the realisation of its environmental interests.  
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The expressions for the optimal type-dependent effort are given in the appendix 
(equations (A16) and (A17)), and they show that for effort to be positive for both 





2E g'N'h)(pg'          
The left hand side represents the realisation of the economic interests measured as 
the short run marginal harvest as valued by the authorities plus the value of the 
(marginal) regulation. The right hand side represents the realisation of the 
environmental interests measured as the value of the marginal long term harvest 
plus the shadow value of the stock externality. For MSYXX   both sides are 
positive. When (15) is fulfilled, a single regulator will regulate a high cost fisher 
stricter than he/she will regulate a low cost fisher, and the type dependent 
regulations are given in the appendix (equations (A19) and (A20)).  
The conjunction of high cost fishers’ effort being distorted downward and short 
term equilibrium harvesting implies that we have a new equilibrium compared to 
that under symmetric information with one principal. In this asymmetric 
equilibrium the stock size is higher, and thus the first best effort will be different 
from the symmetric first best equilibrium. This was first time shown by JENSEN 
AND VESTERGAARD [2002b], who indicate that the asymmetric first best 
equilibrium effort probably is higher than the symmetric. 
The situation when two uninformed principals regulate one and the same agent 
simultaneously is denoted common agency. The main challenge in common 
agencies is that each principal’s regulation no longer is only a matter between the 
principal and the agent, but must also be an optimal response to the regulation 
forwarded by the other principal. We assume that the ENGO, which is allowed a 
say in the fisheries’ regulation, faces the same informational asymmetry as the 
authorities with respect to whether the fishers have high or low harvest costs. 
Furthermore, we assume that (15) above is fulfilled, such that it is optimal for the 
authorities, when the sole regulator, to apply a regulation which implies 
information revelation.  
Let HL,i,Evv i1i0i  and HL,i,Eυυ i1i0i   be the regulation forwarded by the 
authorities and the ENGO, respectively. The incentive compatibility restriction, 
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whereas the participation constraint, which is binding for a high cost fisher, is 
given by 
                                                 
9
 See the appendix, AIV, for the derivation of this condition. 
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(17)   )E)a()a(()E)a(v)a(v(Ea)E,X(pg HH1H0HH1H02HHH     
Each principal maximises expected utility taking into account the binding 
constraints for the low and the high cost fishers, and the stock equilibrium 
constraint, which is now given by (18)
10
  






HHLL   
where πi, i=L,H, is the probability for a low (L) and a high (H) cost fisher 
respectively.   
The optimal regulation for the low and high cost fishers respectively, formulated 
































































































































PROPOSITION 3  Under asymmetric information, giving a new stakeholder a say in 
the fisheries regulation changes the original regulation of both types of fisher.  
PROOF Comparing the reaction functions given in (19)-(22) with the optimal 
regulations with one principal (see equations (A19) and (A20) in the appendix) 
                                                 
10
 See (A22) in appendix AIV, for a formal presentation of the optimisation problem. 
11
 Explicit expressions for the optimal regulations are given in the appendix, AIV.  
 
 13 
shows that the last part of (19) and (20) coincides with (A19) and the last part of 
(21) and (22) coincides with (A20). Hence, the effect of introducing a new 
stakeholder in the fisheries regulations is given by the first right hand term of 
(19)-(22). When it is optimal for the ENGO to tax the fishers’ effort, i.e. υ1H, υ1L 
>0, the authorities reduce their regulation whereas they increase it when it is 
optimal for the ENGO to support effort, i.e. offer a subsidy. This is the case for 
both the low and the high cost fisher’s regulation. Q.E.D.  
PROPOSITION 4  The inclusion of a new stakeholder may contribute to information 
revelation not being an optimal strategy even if this was the case with one 
regulator.  
PROOF Compared to the results from the case with two principals and symmetric 
information, it can be seen that (19) and (20) coincide with (8) and (9), as long as 
1111 tv,  . Hence, the low cost fishers are first best regulated, and the net 
incentive scheme they face is given by (10). The explicit expressions for the high 
cost fishers’ regulations are given in (A28) and (A29) in appendix AIV, and the 
net incentive scheme for a high cost fisher is given by   
(23) 























This scheme is stricter than the net incentive scheme for a low cost fisher, i.e. (23) 
is larger than (10) when  






Compared to (15), which secures information revelation with one regulator, it is 
not obvious that (24) is fulfilled given that (15) is fulfilled. For example, with a 
high income share of the regulation revenue to the authorities, µ, and a low share 
to the ENGO, η, combined with a high shadow price on the stock for the ENGO, 
φ, and a low shadow price on the stock for the authorities, γ, (24) will not be 
fulfilled even if (15) is fulfilled. Following the argumentation in section 2 for why 
(12) is always fulfilled for MSYXX  , it is less likely that (24) is fulfilled than that 
(15) is fulfilled. To secure information revelation as an optimal strategy for both 
regulators it must be the case that the optimal effort for a high cost fisher is 
positive, or that (24) is fulfilled.
12
 Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION 5  Under asymmetric information and given that information 
revelation is an optimal strategy, the type-dependent regulations become more 
                                                 
12
 The expressions for the optimal effort for a high cost fisher as regarded by the regulators are 
given by equations (A24) and (A26) in the appendix. 
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equal when a new stakeholder with stronger environmental interests and weaker 
economic interests is given a say in the fisheries regulation. 
PROOF We now assume that information revelation is an optimal strategy for each 
of the regulators. Proposition 5 implies that the left hand term in (24) relative to 
the right hand term is smaller compared to the left and right hand terms in (15). 
































 are the optimal type-dependent regulations with one regulator. 
      
This effect can be explained by the fact that giving an ENGO a say in the 
fisheries’ regulation implies a stricter regulation of all fishers, and thus a lower 
effort and harvest level. Information revelation implies that there is a trade-off 
between reducing a high cost fisher’s effort and acquiring a low cost fisher’s rent. 
The optimal trade-off depends on the first best effort level, and it is lower, i.e. it is 
optimal with a smaller distortion of the high cost fishers’ effort, the lower the first 
best effort level is. This follows from the fishers’ pay off function combined with 
the incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Q.E.D. 
As a low cost fisher is regulated optimally, his effort level is the first best and 
























When the regulation of a high cost fisher is stricter than that of a low cost fisher, 
expected total effort, and thus harvest, is lower compared to in a first best 
situation. Then the stock must be at a higher level. However, a higher stock level 
means that for the same effort level, fishers will harvest more, and thus the 
equilibrium first best short run effort is higher. This is the same result as that of 
JENSEN AND VESTERGAARD [2002a)] in their single PA-model. Relative to the 
single PA model, common agency implies an even higher stock as the 
introduction of a new stakeholder with higher environmental interests involves a 
stricter regulation of both types of fishers. On the other hand, under information 
asymmetries the result is a more equal equilibrium regulation of the two types of 
fishers, and thus more equal effort levels. 
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 See the appendix, AIV, equations (A30) and (A31), for the derivation of this result. 
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Regarding the lump sum transfers, they have to be formulated such that accepting 
both regulations yields the fishers a higher pay-off than accepting only one 
regulation. In addition the sum of the lump sum transfers must allow a low cost 
fisher a rent equal to 0E)aa(
2
HLH  , whereas a high cost fisher gets no rent. 
The lump sum transfers from each of the principals do not need to fulfil these 
conditions separately.
15
   
 
4 Discussion and conclusions 
Letting new interest groups, such as ENGOs, have a say in the regulation of the 
fishing activity has consequences for the authorities’ regulation of the fishery. 
Using a simple optimal regulation model and a Cournot game we show that when 
an ENGO, with stronger environmental interests than the authorities, is given a 
say in the fisheries’ regulation, the authorities in equilibrium relax their 
regulation, but the aggregate of the two regulations is higher. Introducing 
information asymmetries we show that although information revelation was an 
optimal strategy with one principal, this is not necessarily the case in a common 
agency. When information revelation is an optimal strategy for both regulators, 
the result above is valid for the regulation offered to both low and high cost 
fishers. However, due to the stricter regulation which yields lower effort, in 
equilibrium harvest is on a lower level under two principals and the steady state 
stock is higher. As a consequence the difference between the regulation of the 
high and low cost fishers under information asymmetries will decrease. 
The explicit use of so-called Walsh-contracts, i.e. linear contracts with a unit 
(effort) regulation and a lump sum term, is, admittedly, not very common within 
fisheries. On the other hand, one may claim that the way fisheries management 
work in many countries can be compared with a Walsh-contract, as the fishing 
activity on the one hand is regulated both with respect to input and output, but on 
the other hand also receive (financial) support in order to secure the survival of 
the fishers. A more concrete example of this type of contract within the fisheries 
may be the Norwegian NOx trust fund, which is a voluntary environmental 
agreement between the Government and the Norwegian Association of 
Enterprises (NHO). Instead of paying a general tax on NOx-emissions, 
participants in the fund either reduce their emissions or pay a tax into the fund. In 
return, they are allowed to ask for support from the fund to implement NOx-
reducing efforts.  
As of yet there are few empirical examples of how ENGOs have influenced and 
altered the regulations of fisheries, either at super-national or at national levels. 
However, currently there are changes taking place which can be interpreted as if 
ENGOs are gaining influence on the fisheries policy around the world. One such 
example is the establishment and growth of the Marine Stewardship Council 
                                                 
15
 See the appendix, AII, for the derivation of the optimal lump sum transfers. 
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(MSC), which in 2009 celebrated its 10
th
 anniversary. The organisation issues 
certificates to fisheries which operate and are managed in a sustainable manner 
and with a minimum of environmental impact. During its 10 first years of 
operation the MSC has certified more than 40 fisheries around the world.   
The newly established RACs (Regional Advisory Council) within the European 
common fisheries policy (CFP) encompass in addition to fishers and the fishing 
industry also ENGOs. So far, the RACs have only had an advisory function, and 
their role cannot be interpreted as that of a principal. However, their establishment 
opens for the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders, and if regionalisation of 
EU fisheries management due to ecosystem based management requirements is 
pursued further, we may end up in a situation where the ENGOs more directly 
have a say in EU fisheries management and can be regarded as a principal.  
The model rests on the assumption that fishers only have economic interests when 
fishing, and not environmental and social interests. This is obviously a 
simplification, and expanding the model to a more sophisticated objective 
function for the fishers so that it encompasses both environmental and economic 
interests would enable us to treat uncertainty in line with CICCARONE AND 
MARCHETTI [2012]. This is a task for future research.       
Finally, we have assumed away the case when it is optimal for one or both of the 
principals to close down the fishery. It could be of interest to extend the model 





AI The optimal regulation with one regulator and symmetric information 
With one regulator the optimisation problem of the regulator is as follows: 
(A1)     KEwwaEEXpgEXhU MSMSMSE 10221 ),(),(max     







      
Using the fact that the participation constraint in equilibrium will be fulfilled with 



















     
were γ is the Lagrange multiplier, which is also the shadow price of the stock. The 
fisher’s optimisation problem is given in (A5) 
(A5) E)w(w)aEE)(pg(X,Umax 10
2F
E        








          
Equalising (A4) and (A6) yields (11).   
 
AII The optimal regulations with two regulators and symmetric information 

















































λNgλλh' 212 ')(  
If the agent chooses to reject the national authorities’ regulation it can either 
accept only the regulation of the ENGO, which will provide them a pay-off equal 
to ),,0,0(U 10
F  , or reject both regulations. In the latter case we assume that the 
pay-off to the fishers corresponds to the outside option. Thus, denoting the pay-off 
to the agent from rejecting the authorities’ regulation U
F
-MS, we get 
 0),,,0,0(UmaxU 10FMSF  . Correspondingly, denoting the pay-off to the 
agent of rejecting the ENGO’s regulation U
F
-NGO, we get  
 0),0,0,t,t(UmaxU 10FNGOF  . Hence, given the regulation of one principal, the 
agent’s pay-off from accepting the other principal’s regulation will equal the pay-





F UU),,t,t(U   .  
If 0),,t,t(U 1010
F  , implying that it is better for the agent to accept at least 






F  . This means that a vector 
),t( 00   must exist which fulfils the following conditions: 
(A9)   ***1***12****00 EEtaE)E,X(pgt          
(A10)   ***12*****0 EtaE)E,X(pgt         





 equal zero, which we have shown that they do not do in 
equilibrium, the three conditions can not be fulfilled simultaneously.  
If 0),,t,t(U 1010
F   implying that the agent is indifferent between accepting 




F  . This means that a vector ),t( 00   must 
exist which fulfils (A9) and where the conditions (A10) and (A11) need only be 
fulfilled with inequalities (the left hand side must be less or equal to the right hand 
side), which is a feasible set of conditions.  
 
AIII The optimal regulation with one regulator and asymmetric information    
Let H,Li,E)a(r)a(r ii1i0   denote the type dependent regulation, where Ei is 














    
  
The high cost fishers have no possibility to achieve a positive rent and thus the 
participation constraint is binding, which implies 
(A13)   )E)a(r)a(r(Ea)E,X(pg HH1H02HHH       
Inserting for the participation constraint for the high cost fisher and taking into 
account that the incentive compatibility constraint as given by (A12) is binding 
for the low cost fisher we get
16
:  
(A12a)   )E)a(r)a(r(E)aa(Ea)E,X(pg LL1L02HLH2LLL     
Assuming that the probability for a low cost fisher is given by πL and for a high 
cost fisher by πH, the authorities’ expected utility is given by 
(A14) 























            
The authorities maximise the expected utility conditioned on the incentive 
compatibility constraint for a low cost fisher, (A12’), and the participation 
constraint for a high cost fisher, (A13), in addition to the equilibrium fishing 
condition, which is now given by 






     
Inserting for (A12’) and (A13) in (A14) and maximising (A14) with respect to E 
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 Note that these conditions imply that both types of fishers remain in the fishery  
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AIV Optimal regulations with two regulators and asymmetric information 
(Common agency)   
For it to be profitable for the low cost fisher to choose the regulation intended for 
















Inserting for the participation constraint for a high cost fisher, given in (17), in 
(A21) yields (16).  
The optimisation problem for regulator k, k=MS, NGO, is now given by  
(A22)





































   























































































    














       
Equalising the type dependent effort level between the fishers and each of the 
principals and solving for the principal’s regulation, yields the type dependent 
reaction functions in (19)-(22).  
The explicit expressions for the optimal regulations of the high cost fishers are  
(A28) 





















           
(A29) 
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Let 

















The low-cost fisher regulations are first best regulations, and in section 2 we 
showed that this regulation was higher when there were two regulators compared 
to one. From this property and the assumptions made about the parameters when 









































which in turn reduces to 
   QKR2QSL2RKL2RS'QpgL2RSKQ E    
For low 
NGO
2  the left hand parenthesis is negative and thus the left hand side is 
negative. For low 
MS
2  and high 
NGO
1  the right hand side parenthesis is positive 
and thus the right hand side is positive. Hence (25) is fulfilled.  
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